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 What is the broad impact of sport participation and sport activities in a society? The first
aim of this paper is tackling this crucial point by studying whether or not there is a relationship
between sport participation and crime. A panel dataset have been constructed for the twenty
Italian regions over the period 1997-2003. The impact of spot participation on different type of
crimes has been studied. Results show that: (i) there is a robust negative association between
sport participation and property crime; (ii) There is a robust negative association between sport
participation and juvenile crime; (iii) There is a positive association between sport participation
and violent crime, but it is only weakly significant.
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Abstract: What is the broad impact of sport participation and sport activities in a 
society? The first aim of this paper is tackling this crucial point by studying 
whether or not there is a relationship between sport participation and crime. A 
panel dataset have been constructed for the twenty Italian regions over the period 
1997-2003. The impact of spot participation on different type of crimes has been 
studied. Results show that: (i) there is a robust negative association between sport 
participation and property crime; (ii) There is a robust negative association 
between sport participation and juvenile crime; (iii) There is a positive 
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In the latest years, a growing attention on sport emerged. The common wisdom 
about sport participation takes for granted the idea that a beneficial impact of 
sport on society is predictable. The Commission of European Union, for example, 
in 2007 released a white paper on sport which emphasizes the beneficial impact of 
sport on society
1. The White Paper defines "sport" as “all forms of physical 
                                                 
1 COM(2007) 391 final, Presented by the Commission: SEC(2007) 932, SEC(2007) 934, 
SEC(2007) 935, SEC(2007) 936, available at http://ec.europa.eu/sport/white-paper/index_en.htm 
(April 2009).  
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activity which, through casual or organised participation, aim at expressing or 
improving physical fitness and mental well-being, forming social relationships or 
obtaining results in competition at all levels." In particular, the white paper 
stresses some specific benefits related to sport participation as: (i) public health 
through physical activity; (ii) reinforcement of human capital thanks to 
development of knowledge, motivation, skills and readiness for personal effort; 
(iii) active citizenship, social inclusion and integration. In brief, sport seems to 
enhance both individual and social well-being. Moreover, the white paper also 
focuses upon the importance and peculiarities of professional sport industry. 
Albeit many significant shortcomings, the White paper has the merit of 
recognising that sport has a role which goes beyond the mere competition between 
individuals or teams.  
  Needless to say, as noted above, the white paper rests to a large extent 
upon the widespread idea that sport is a beneficial for society. But please consider 
that this is a modern idea. In medieval societies, for example, sport was 
considered the peacetime occupation of the nobles whose main business was 
represented by war. In sum, sport participation was not presented as enjoyment or 
leisure but it would descend from warring attitudes of men. It was somehow 
ancillary to the training for war. There was no beneficial impact on society at that 
time.  
  Hence, in this paper I am concerned with that point of view which assumes 
a beneficial impact of sport on society. I do not want necessarily propose a 
different way of thinking. I only want to highlight some points we might look in 
order to better evaluate the societal role of sport participation. In fact, the aim of 
this paper is tackling this crucial point by studying empirically whether or not 
there is a relationship between sport participation and crime. That is, the 
approach here is that of studying the potential benefits of sport participation 
indirectly. Instead of choosing a disputable aggregate measure of well-being, it is 
assumed that fewer (or less intense) negative factors can lead to more desirable 
social outcomes. In fact, ceteris paribus, henceforth I assume that a social 
outcome exhibiting fewer crimes must be preferred to a social outcome 
characterized by a higher level of crime. Hence, in common-sense terms, the 
impact of sport participation on crime is expected to be negative.  
  However, the association is not so clear when considering different types 
of crime. For example, if we can consider the negative association between 
individual crime and sport predictable, we cannot do the same with organised 
crime and juvenile gangs’ phenomenon. In many cases, for example, juvenile 
crime and violence emerge in the presence of juvenile groups clustered around 
sport participation identity. Narratives of hooliganism sadly confirm this. 
Moreover, other studies pointed out positive associations between sports and 
increased problem behavior. For example, young athletes have higher levels of 
alcohol use, binge drinking and an increased tendency to be involved in physical 
fights than non-athletes. (Endresen and Olweus, 2005, Rutten et al., 2007). 
  Therefore, these simple examples show how the broad question still 
remains largely unanswered. What is the broad impact of sport participation and 
sport activities in a society?    3
 
* * * 
Albeit a theoretical reasoning, the approach of this work is intrinsically empirical. 
A panel dataset have been constructed for the twenty Italian regions over the 
period 1997-2003. The paper can be ideally split into two macro-sections. In a 
first section, I try a theoretical deepening of sport participation. Sport participation 
is interpreted in the light of Kenneth Boulding’s theory of social interactions. In 
particular it is interpreted as a good retaining a multiple nature which combines (i) 
exchange; (ii) coercion and (iii) integrative relationship. In a second section, the 
impact of sport participation on the rate of property crimes is estimated by means 
of a panel data for Italian regions. Eventually a summary of findings and a related 
discussion is presented.  
 
 
The economic nature of Sport participation 
 
Before analysing in depth the relationship between sport participation and crime, 
we need a punctual definition of sport in economic terms. Elsewhere I defined 
sport as: «a joint indivisible good, which is produced and consumed contextually 
by different agents. It retains a multiple nature. In fact, it is a combination of : (i) 
a market leisure good, (ii) a relational good and (iii) an expression  of power and 
coercion», see Caruso (2008b).   
 
* * * 
There is no need to explain the dimension of sport as market leisure good and its 
by-products. This is domain of classical sport economics which has been 
expanding for latest recent years, and whose founding pillars are Rottenberg 
(1956) and Neale (1964). Comprehensive accounts are Fort and Quirk (1995), 
Szymanski (2003), Zimbalist (2003) and Andreff (2008) and an original 
interpretation in the light of theory of multisided markets is in Budzinski and 
Satzer (2008).  
 
* * * 
Instead, in order to define the ‘relational component’ of sport participation I do 
refer to a growing strand of economic literature which focuses on beneficial 
impact of relational goods in societal development. The concept of relational 
goods has been developed in Ulhaner (1989), Gui (2000), Bruni (2006a) and 
Bruni and Stanca (2006) among others. First, relational goods “depend upon 
interactions among persons” (Ulhaner 1989, p. 253) and are peculiar intangible 
outputs of an affective and communicative nature (Gui 2000) that are produced 
through social interactions. Relational goods present some main characteristics. 
They are non rival. According to Uhlaner, “Relational goods can only be enjoyed 
with some others”. Second, production and consumption of such goods cannot be 
disentangled. They must be contextual and simultaneous. It seems to be 
reasonable, when considering that relational goods emerge from the interaction 
between agents. The relational good it is nothing but the relation itself. It must be   4
produced and consumed contextually. Eventually, motivations of agents matter. 
Goodwill is important for their production.  
  Of course, trivial to say, a relational good cannot be anonymous in any 
case. It must emerge at a particular time and place. In fact, a relational good 
produced and consumed by agents A and B at a particular time and place 
necessarily does differ from a relational good produced by agents C and D in a 
different place or time. Suppose for simplicity that A=C and B=D. Even in this 
case, a relational good produced and consumed by A and B does differ from a 
similar good produced by A and B either in a different place or time. Take the 
example of a sport activity. If two friends, Ivan and Jacob,  play tennis everyday, 
the relational good - ‘tennis match’ – takes a different shape everyday. The 
Monday match will be different from Tuesday match and so on. Needless to say, a 
match played by Ivan and Jacob will different from a match played between John 
and Jimmy. This holds for most relational goods and is particularly true in the 
case of sport activities. In brief, a relational good is necessarily a named good in 
the spirit of Hahn (1971).  
 Eventually, the value of any relational good also depends upon the fellow 
feeling as expounded by Adam Smith in the Theory of Moral Sentiments, which is 
a feeling of sympathy based upon shared experiences. Hence, the expected value 
the relational good consumed will depend upon the individual traits and 
inclinations of agents involved. Motivations do matter. A good disposition 
increases the probability that agents can sustain cooperative environments. It 
appears to be that there is also an important linkage between relational goods and 
economic development through the channel of a superior trustworthiness in an 
economic system.  
 
* * * 
The third element refers to the presence of coercion in sport activities. In fact, in 
many cases, sport participation is by no means a pure expression of voluntary 
choice. It can involve threat, coercion, aggressive behaviour and extreme 
competition. In the eyes of the economist, these behaviours are intrinsically 
unproductive or even destructive. To explain this point, historical examples are 
more effective. In fact, Soviet Union does constitute a good example in this 
respect. In fact, since the end of World War II, the East European (and world 
communist) sports system has been dominated by clubs of the security forces and 
armed forces. Most sports heroes, therefore, have officially been soldiers or police 
officers, guardians of public order and role models for a disciplined, obedient and 
patriotic citizenry. Thus, to many people, sport, has been identified in the popular 
consciousness with paramilitary coercion (Riordan, 1993). Sport participation was 
an element of a broader mechanism designed to fully control the society (Howell, 
1975, Cooper, 1989). Moreover, sport system was also interpreted as ancillary to 
foreign policy. In fact, success in sport has aided USSR, East Germany, Cuba and 
other socialist countries to gain international recognition and prestige (Riordan, 
1974). Nowadays, this phenomenon is pervasive in many autocracies. However, 
unfortunately there are some examples of sporting clubs directly managed by 
security forces even in the western democracies. However, such intertwining   5
between sports and military dates back to past ages. As noted above, in medieval 
societies, sport was considered the peacetime occupation of the nobles whose 
main business was represented by war (Carter, 1985). In sum, sport participation 
was not presented as enjoyment or leisure but it would descend from warring 
attitudes of men.  
 
* * * 
The multiple dimension of sport participation can be interpreted following and 
enriching the theoretical approach expounded by British economist Kenneth 
Boulding (see. Boulding, 1963, 1973, 1978). To Boulding, the social system can 
be divided into three large, overlapping and interacting sub-systems: (i) exchange, 
(ii) threat and (iii) integrative system. All human institutions and relationships 
involve different combinations of all three. All three organizers are necessary for 
society to flourish. In a nutshell, the modern economy is dominated by exchange 
whereas a bounded threat system is asked to support the legal order necessary for 
social stability. Third, the economy also depends on integrative relationships. For 
example, trust and honesty are needed for the development of the financial 
system. Hence, all three components coexist. For sake of formal simplicity, let 
c b a , ,  denote respectively the intensity of threat, exchange and integration. In 
particular, we can easily assume that, 0 ≥ a , 0 ≥ b , 0 > c , under the 
constraint 1 = + + c b a .  
  Exchange relationships constitute the usual domain of economics. In its 
simplest form, two parties agree to exchange something with something else, 
usually money with goods and services. It is commonly understood as a positive 
sum game in which parties can be better off after the exchange is concluded. 
However, it still retains co-operative and competitive elements.  
 The  threat system, in its simplest form, is also a relationship between two 
parties and one party is capable to affect the other party behaviour through 
coercion. It is summarised in the statement: “If you do not do something (or you 
do) I shall do something nasty to you”. In fact, by coercion, it is intended that 
behaviour shaped and influenced by the existence of a credible threat. A credible 
threat depends upon the potential exploitation of brutal force. Under a credible 
threat the choices of an agent are made under coercion. Even though agents have 
options to make a choice, this is not purely voluntary (see on this point Basu 
2007). Economic activity is full of examples. It is common sense that an executive 
can threaten a worker of firing. The government threatens individuals of 
expropriation if they do not pay taxes, or a state can threaten a tariff retaliation if 
another state (or a group of states) does not comply with some obligations. The 
threat system is less productive than exchange systems simply because exchange 
of goods encourages the production of goods, whereas threat discourages the 
production of goods. In sum a threat system is intrinsically unproductive 
(destructive).  At the same time, a threat system is unstable in the long run.  
  In the context of this work, I am much more interested in the theory of 
integrative system. Among individuals, an integrative relationship involves a 
complex spectrum of feelings, such as respect, love, affection and so on. It also 
involves other concepts emerging between individuals as well as organisations:   6
legitimacy, status, sense of identity, community etc. In its romantic view, an 
integrative relationship implies a ‘meeting of minds’ (Boulding 1963, p. 425). In 
general terms, an integrative system needs first an interdependence of utility 
functions of parties involved. Second, an integrative system can take shape only in 
the presence of unilateral transfers. Namely in the presence of interactions which 
do not imply an exchange between agents. The classical example to be produced 
is the gift-giving. In fact, the integrative system is directly linked with the very 
fabric of human sociality. Emergence of relational goods – as defined above – 
does fit perfectly with Boulding’s integrative system. More precisely, it can be 
sustained that emergence of relational take place in the context of an integrative 
system. Moreover, the emergence of relational goods within an integrative system 
reinforces the establishment and the compliance of social norms.  
  In our context, it is noteworthy a significant enrichment to the Boulding’s 
theory of integrative system, which can be appropriately provided. In spite of 
Boulding’s silence on this, in fact, an integrative system appears also to challenge 
the standard theory of rational individual choice. In fact, rational agents in the 
midst of an integrative relationship may act and make choices as they were 
members of a team. This is one interpretation I am drawing from Sugden (2000)
2. 
Following Sugden’s language, individuals may conceive of themselves as 
members of a group or team. Therefore, the decision-making problem implies a 
different  framing  of the problem. Namely, « [...] the individual frames the 
problem not as ‘What should I do’, but as ‘What should we
3 do?’ […]
4». The 
author termed it Team-directed reasoning. Needless to say it represents a 
significant departure from the standard rational choice theory. Being formally, 
such a behaviour implies that there is an only one team-directed utility function « 
[…] which assigns a single utility index […] to be called ‘team-directed’ utility 
[…] to be interpreted as a representation of team-directed preferences over the 
relevant outcomes, […]
5». In short, in the presence of team preferences, the 
representation of the relevant outcome is unique for interacting players. This 
simplifies the interdependence of utility functions as predicted by Boulding to 
define an integrative system. In Sugden’s team-directed reasoning the integrative 
interdependence reduces exactly to convergence of utility functions. Perhaps, this 
may occur whenever the intensity of integrative behaviours is sufficiently high. 
That is, whenever the integrative behaviours dominate both exchange and threat 
behaviours. Take the example of a family. A wife and her husband are supposed 
(or expected) to exhibit a team-directed reasoning. In such a case, the intensity of 
integrative of behaviours reaches the maximum level (love). A team-directed 
utility function takes shape and there is an only one representation of the relevant 
outcome. This is neither frivolous nor trivial because the intensity of integrative 
behaviour has significant implications on consumption, fertility choices and 
education of children. These represent classical problems studied by political 
                                                 
2 For the purpose of this work, it is interesting to note that in developing the theory Sugden 
produces an example drawn from sports termed ‘the footballers’ problem’.  
3 Emphasis in the original.  
4 Sugden (2000), p.  
5 Sugden (2000), p.192, emphasis in the original.    7
economy. In a nutshell, Sugden’s team-directed reasoning may be interpreted as a 
special case of Boulding’s integrative system.  
  In broader terms, this also recalls the idea of ecological rationality as 
expounded by Smith (2008). To cite punctually: « […] The behavior of an 
individual, a market, an institution, or other social system involving collectives of 




* * * 
The multiple definition of sport participation envisioned here is one in which the 
shape of outcome depends on intensity of different elements. In developing the 
point, we assume that the integrative intensity of sport participation must be 
necessarily positive, whilst threat and exchange elements perhaps can also exhibit 
a null intensity. This leads to an enriched and revised definition of sport as: «a 
joint indivisible good, which is produced and consumed contextually by different 
agents in a certain place and time. It retains a multiple nature. In fact, it is a 
combination of: (i) a market leisure good, (ii) a relational good  and (iii) an 
expression of power and coercion. They differ in intensity, but differently from (i) 
and (iii) the relational component must be necessarily positive.» Eventually, given 
such a definition we can also produce a conjecture: 
 
CONJECTURE:  Sport may be beneficial for society as long as the relational 
behaviours dominate both the coercive and the exchange components.  
 
How such a conjecture might be defended? To do that we can refer to the growing 
literature about the impact of relational goods. As noted above, in fact, sport like 
other ‘relational goods’ is supposed to produce a positive externality which enters 
positively the utility function of individuals. Therefore, the overall benefit to 
society is commonly supposed to be positive. A well-known positive correlation 
between happiness of individuals and relational goods is commonly recognized. 
Becchetti et al. (2006) and Becchetti et al. (2008), show that relational goods have 




Data and Empirical Evidence 
 
Henceforth, I try an empirical investigation on the association between sport 
participation and three types of crime: (i) property crime; (ii) violent crime; (iii) 
juvenile crime. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of variables used. All data are 
extracted from Italian national statistical office (ISTAT). All figures are collected 
on regional basis. Italian administrative regions correspond to NUTS II- level 
divisions as coded in the European Union.  
 
                                                 
6 Smith (2008), p. 36.    8
TABLE 1 -  DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  (SOURCE: ISTAT. YEARS 1997-2003) 
Variables (Logged)  Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min  Max   
            
Property Crime rates  140  4.02  0.181  3.22  4.33   
Violent Crime   140  2.33  0.359  1.16  3.41   
Juvenile Crime  140  0.96  0.305  0.095 1.67   
Sport Participation  140  3.34  0.252  2.83  3.87   
Unemployement 140  2.18  0.596  0.9  3.2   
Unemployment  (one year lagged)   140  2.23  0.569  0.9  3.2   
GDP per capita   140  9.71  0.317  7.6  10.1   
Literacy 140  4.22  0.103  3.92  4.42   
Security 140  6.48  1.069  3.7  8   
Social Protection  140  5.38  0.998  3.24  7.49   
                   
 
The results of this study are reported in tables 2,3 and 4 below. In table 2 the 
dependent variable is rate of property crime (logged). Property crimes are thefts, 
robberies and burglaries. In table 2, the main finding is that sport participation 
indeed significantly reduces the level of property crime. In table 3, the dependent 
variable is the rate of violent crime. The index of violent crime is computed as the 
rate of violent crime per ten thousands of inhabitants. Violent crimes are rapes, 
homicides, kidnappings, injuries and lesions. It is shown that sport participation is 
positively associated with violent crime. However, the evidence is only weakly 
significant. In table 4, the dependent variable is the rate of juvenile crime defined 
as the percentage of crimes committed by minors (<18 years old) on the total 
number of crimes. Sport participation is negatively associated with the level of 
juvenile crime.  
  In all tables, column 1 reports the simplest baseline model. The dependent 
variable is regressed only on the sport participation rate. At the same time, I 
investigate eight different specifications. In table 2 in all of them the association 
between property crime and sport participation is negative and highly significant. 
In table 3 the results show a positive association between violent crime and sport 
participation. In table 4, all further specifications confirm a negative association 
between sport participation and juvenile crime.  
  In all specifications, a very significant covariate is the lagged 
unemployment rate. There is an established literature which analysed the impact 
of unemployment on crime rates (see Britt, 1997 for a review). Criminologists and 
other social scientists have been often interested in the relationship between crime 
and economic development. In fact, unemployment is often considered as a proxy 
of general economic conditions. Of course, it is expected to capture the 
opportunity cost of committing crimes. Even GDP per capita is frequently 
assumed to be a measure of social well-being. However, it is widely 
acknowledged that the use of GDP (or alternatively GNP) as a measure of 
progress of nations is strongly criticised. In fact it can be misleading. First, GDP 
per capita may measure the aggregate economic activity and not the social well-
being. Second, the GDP measures only the current economic activity but says   9
little about future economic scenario. By contrast, individuals take into account 
current as well as future conditions. This is particularly important when 
considering crime. In fact, as Campiglio (1990) pointed out, the rate of 
unemployment does capture the expected difference in returns between legal and 
illegal activities. The higher is the rate of unemployment the smaller is this 
difference. Therefore, the opportunity cost of committing crime is lower. There 
are several empirical studies either confirming or denying this point. Scorcu and 
Cellini (1998) shows how the long-term trend of property crimes is associated 
with unemployment in Italy over the period 1951-1994. The specification also 
follows the intuition expounded in Levitt (2001) which includes both current 
unemployment rate and lagged unemployment rates. Following this intuition, the 
choice of committing a crime does depend on both current and past income. 
Eventually, in table 1 lagged unemployment is significantly associated with crime 
rates in specification 2,3, 5, 6, and 7. In table 3, it seems to be negatively 
associated with violent crime but the association is weakly significant. In table 4, 
lagged unemployment is positively associated with juvenile crime. In particular, 
the association is more robust in the column 2 where the specification is more 
parsimonious. However, GDP per capita has been also included as covariate in all 
tables. It does not show any significant association with crime rates.   
 
TABLE 2. RESULTS- SPORT PARTICIPATION AND CRIME IN ITALY 1997 -2003 –  
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: INDEX OF PROPERTY CRIME 


























Sport  -0,45* -0,30* -0,29* -0,24** -0,30*     -0,27** 
  (0,10) (0,05) (0,11) (0,11) (0,11)      (0,12) 
  [0,00] [0,01] [0,01] [0,03] [0,01]      [0,03] 
GDP per capita       0,00  0,01    
       (0,04)  (0,04)    
       [0,91]  [0,84]    
(Sport x Literacy)        -0,05*    
           (0,02)    
        [0,01]    
(Sport x GDP per capita)         -0,01   
         (0,01)   
         [0,18]   
Unemployement     0,01       
     (0,05)       
     [0,84]       
Lagged Unemployement 
(t-1)    0,14* 0,13*    0,14* 0,12** 0,16*  0,01 
    (0,11) (0,06)    (0,05) (0,06) (0,05) (0,07) 
   [0,01]  [0,05]  [0,01]  [0,04]  [0,00]  [0,90] 
Literacy         -0,14  0,13 
         (0,18)  (0,19) 
         [0,45]  [0,51] 
Security      0,45        10
      (0,28)      
       [0,11]        
Social Protection      -0,43*      -0,37* 
      (0,11)      (0,14) 
            [0,00]           [0,01] 
constant 5,53  4,7  4,68*  4,2*  4,7*  4,44*  4,62*  6,34* 
  (0,33) (0,44) (0,45) (1,62) (0,53) (0,48) (0,78) (0,95) 
       [0,00] [0,00] [0,01] [0,00] [0,00] [0,00] [0,00] 
Obs  140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 
Groups  20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
                          
R
2 within  0,15 0,2  0,2 0,25 0,20 0,2 0,18 0,24 
R
2 between  0,36  0,3  0,3  0,16 0,29 0,25 0,21 0,57 
R
2overall  0,22 0,17 0,17 0,09 0,17 0,14 0,12 0,42 
Note: standard errors in parenthesis. P-values in square brackets. Significant coefficients in bold.; * 1%, ** 5%, *** 10%. 
 
Surprisingly, spending on security seems to be ineffective in all specifications. 
Namely, it seems that deterrence has no role whatsoever in preventing or reducing 
crime. However, this seems to confirm the results presented in Caruso (2009) for 
organised crime. In all tables, the association between types of crime and literacy 
is not conclusive. In table 2 and 3, there is no significant association between 
crime and literacy. Instead in table 4, the association between juvenile crime and 
sport participation is negative and highly significant. However, it is interesting to 
note that the interaction term between sport participation and literacy (sport × 
literacy) shows a significant negative association in all tables. This result 
somehow recalls the evidence proposed in Downward (2007) which highlights a 
strong interdependence between sport participation and education. Therefore, it 
seems that the degree of literacy reinforces the relational beneficial impact of 
sport participation. This might be an important point for policy formulation. 
Instead, there is no significant association between crime rate and the interaction 
term between sport participation and GDP per capita (sport ×GDP per capita).  
 
TABLE 3. RESULTS- SPORT PARTICIPATION AND VIOLENT CRIME IN ITALY 1997 -2003 –  
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: INDEX OF VIOLENT CRIME 


























Sport 0,42*  0,27***  0,31***    0,30***   0,26  0,26 
  (0,15) (0,17)  (0,19)    (0,18)    (0,19)  (0,17) 
  [0,00] [0,11]  [0,10]    [0,10]    [0,18]  [0,13] 
GDP per capita     -0,00    0,02 0,01    0,18 
     (0,06)    (0,06)  (0,06)    (0,06) 
     [0,99]  [0,78]  [0,83]  [0,75] 
(Sport x Literacy)          0,06***    
          (0,03)     
           [0,08]    
(Sport x GDP per capita)       0,02***        11
       (0,11)      
       [0,08]      
Lagged Unemployement 
(t-1)    -0,13***     -1,19*** -0,18*** -0,18*** -0,13*** 
    (0,08)      (0,11) (0,11) (0,11) (0,08) 
    [0,08]      [0,10] [0,11] [0,11] [0,08] 
Literacy     0,16        0,15   
     (0,27)        (0,30)   
     [0,58]        [0,61]   
Security     0,37  0,53  0,29  0,28  0,30   
     (0,41)  (0,39)  (0,46)  (0,23)  (0,45)   
     [0,36]  [0,17]  [0,52]  [0,27]  [0,51]   
Social Protection        -0,2 -0,25  -0,24   
        (0,22)  (0,23)  (0,24)   
             [0,37]  [0,27]  [0,31]   
constant 0,92  1,72  -1,79  -1,79  0,77  1,3 0,54  1,58** 
  (0,5) (0,67) (2,47)  (2,44) (2,96) (2,91) (3,00) (0,81) 
   [0,07]  [0,01] [0,47] [0,47] [0,79] [0,66] [0,86] [0,05] 
Obs  140  140 140 140 140 140 140 140 
Groups  20  20 20  20 20 20 20 20 
                          
R
2 within  0,06    0,08    0,10 0,10 0,10 0,09 
R
2 between  0,00    0,39    0,04 0,00 0,01 0,04 
R
2overall  0,00    0,35    0,04 0,00 0,01 0,02 
Note: standard errors in parenthesis. P-values in square brackets. Significant coefficients in bold.; * 1%, ** 5%, *** 10%. 
 
 
TABLE 4. RESULTS- SPORT PARTICIPATION AND VIOLENT CRIME IN ITALY 1997 -2003 –  
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: INDEX OF JUVENILE CRIME 


























Sport -0,81*  -0,5***  -0,8*  -0,8*       -0,16 
  (0,25) (0,29) (0,26)  (0,27)        (0,32) 
  [0,00] [0,09] [0,00]  [0,00]        [0,61] 
GDP per capita      -0,04 -0,04 -0,03  -0,06     
      (0,10) (0,10) (0,10)  (0,10)     
      [0,71] [0,71] [0,78]  [0,52]     
(Sport x Literacy)        -0,18* -0,13*    
        (0,45)  (0,05)    
        [0,00]  [0,02]    
(Sport x GDP per capita)           -0,02   
            (0,02)   
            [0,45]   
Lagged Unemployement 
(t-1)    0,27**      0,26***  0,23***  0,15 
    (0,13)      (0,15)  (0,14)  (0,14) 
   [0,03]      [0,08]  [0,10]  [0,28]   12
Literacy            -1,11* -1,06* 
            (0,45)  (0,46) 
            [0,01]  [0,02] 
Security      -0,06  0,35  0,85  0,95   
      (0,66)  (0,67)  (0,72)  (4,91)   
      [0,92]  [0,60]  [0,24]  [0,91]   
constant 3,67  2,00***  3,99*  4,35  1,45  -2,7 -0,53  5,67* 
  (0,85) (1,14) (1,21) (4,2)  (4,2)  (4,8)  (4,91) (1,94) 
   [0,00]  [0,08]  [0,00] [0,30] [0,73]  [0,57]  [0,91]  [0,00] 
Obs  140  140  140 140 140  140  140  140 
Groups  20  20  20 20 20  20  20  20 
                          
R
2 within  0,08 0,11    0,08  0,13 0,15  0,16 0,15 
R
2 between  0,52 0,39    0,49  0,08 0,03  0,01 0,12 
R
2overall  0,22 0,16    0,21  0,03 0,01  0,00 0,02 
Note: standard errors in parenthesis. P-values in square brackets. Significant coefficients in bold.; * 1%, ** 5%, *** 10%. 
 
 
To summarise the main results about the relationship between crime and sport 
participation it is possible to write: 
 
(1) there is a robust negative association between sport participation and 
property crime;  
(2) There is a robust negative association between sport participation and 
juvenile crime; 
(3) There is a positive association between sport participation and violent 
crime. However, it only weakly significant at 10%.  
 
About the association with other covariates, it is noteworthy that:  
 
(4) There is a positive association between the interaction term between sport 
participation and literacy (sport × literacy) and crime rates. The 
association is robust in the case of property crime and juvenile crime. In 
the case of violent crime the association is only weakly significant.  






The results of this work shed new light on the relationship between crime and 
sport participation. The idea that sport participation can have a role in reducing 
social deviances as crime seems to be confirmed. However, needless to say, 
stating that sport participation is not detrimental for society is not equivalent to 
saying that sport participation is surely beneficial for society. Therefore, to study 
the impact of sport participation on societal and individual well-being the analysis 
must be necessarily further deepened.    13
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